I found myself wondering whether these Husserlian works weren’t more in line with the method that Alloa is proposing.
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But of course, one can ask what one asks of any reading of Husserl: which Husserl are you criticising? Alloa’s article explains how to avoid some of the pitfalls of the path taken by the transcendental and egological Husserl of Ideas 1 and Cartesian Meditations, yet many of Alloa’s suggestions concerning the development of a phenomenology of sensory medium would not contradict the Husserl of Ideas 2 (wherein we find the concrete analysis of sensation) and particularly Husserl’s suggestion, found in Ideas 3, that we ought to develop a somatological science.
It explains how Alloa’s position develops as a response to Husserl’s as much as via a reading of Merleau-Ponty (in Alloa 2017). This article presents a precise capitulation of a very important position within the landscape of contemporary phenomenology. Thus, Alloa argues that we ought to adopt a diaphenomenological perspective which examines the mediums through which things appear. What is meaningful can only appear in a medium which can allow sense to be bestowed on it, a medium itself stripped of meaning. Alloa’s analysis suggests an inevitability about this conclusion. Thus, Alloa arrives at his central conclusion: “While Husserlian phenomenology sets off as an exclusion of all mediations, the very return to the things themselves forces him to take mediations into account” (24). The way through the lifeworld brings us only to the backdrop on which things appear, the way through the lived body leads only to that via which I experience the world.
Alloa argues that, to account for how this is possible, Husserl’s analysis that begins with the things themselves inevitably ends up granting consciousness and the ego a wider role in the bestowal of sense than a phenomenological analysis allows.Īlloa argues that every way through the reduction leads to the same antimony between mediacy and appearance. Even though things are given directly, consciousness must do some of the work to allow individuals to appear ‘directly’ (i.e. For Husserl, the structuring function of intentionality allows experience to go beyond the perceptually given sense data and intend a meaningful object. “When something appears, it appears as something, and this appearing as something is what gives the appearance its very meaning” (17). Alloa then points out that such individuals, however, always appear as more than what they are because they are meant.
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Alloa argues that phenomenology ought to be diaphenomenology: which rests on the core claims that what appears in experience (the phenomena) always “appears through something else” (12) diaphenomenology is, purportedly, the terminus of the development of phenomenology.Īlloa observes an aporia which begins from the observation that, for Husserl, the things themselves are given in intuition via a direct relation to an individual. There is scant space here to do justice to all the topics, so I’ll touch on a few highlights and critique one low-point.Įmmanuel Alloa: What is Diaphenomenology? A SketchĪlloa argues that we ought to take a nuanced understanding of the notion of returning to the things themselves just because Husserl states he can return to things themselves and therefore operate only within the realm of pure experience which is given to us in intuition, this shouldn’t be taken to mean that phenomenology has immediate access to the pure unadulterated stuff that experience is made of, nor should we assume that this stuff originates from consciousness.
Thought provoking and refreshingly interesting, with some exceedingly high-quality scholarship.
#Definition animationist series#
A series of variegated contributions to the development of the concept of experience.
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